The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization

In the 2022 nonfiction work The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization, Peter Zeihan argues that the world is in transition from globalization to de-globalization. Declining populations and the withdrawal of US security from global transport are driving this transition, which benefits the US but has dire consequences for most countries. Zeihan is a globalization expert and geopolitical consultant, and he holds a postgraduate degree in Asian studies. The book, which is written for nonexperts, explores several themes, including The Causes and Consequences of De-globalization, Demographic and Geographic Challenges, and The Dominant Role of the US.

This guide references the 2022 hardcover edition.

Content Warning: The book’s analysis of potential future challenges and geopolitical scenarios is intense and could evoke feelings of uncertainty. In addition, the author’s perspective and predictions could be viewed through various lenses, potentially raising concerns about bias or oversimplification.

Summary

The period of globalization, which peaked between 1980 and 2015, was a historical anomaly. During the Cold War between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) following World War II, the US protected global shipping (to prevent interception) and opened its markets to imports. Global commerce flourished until 2015, when the US withdrawal from global security and demographic crises precipitated a return to the natural state of de-globalization. Many countries, especially in Asia and Europe, have few young people and large aging populations. While geographic assets and location were almost irrelevant during the period of globalization, they become important in a de-globalized world. Zeihan analyzes the impact of de-globalization on six economic sectors: transport, finance, energy, industrial materials, manufacturing, and agriculture. He identifies North American countries as most likely to succeed in a de-globalized era, and he names China, among others, as most likely to be impacted.

Safe transportation was critical to globalization, so the world developed a division of labor in which the US provided security. Transportation costs were low, and products came reliably on time. However, if the US no longer protected transport, long-haul shipments would risk interception, forcing countries to fulfill their needs internally or engage in regional trade. Zeihan points to the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, France, and Argentina as the likeliest beneficiaries of this change, given their internal waterways and safe borders. Conversely, the change would disadvantage several countries, including Germany and China, both at the end of exposed supply routes.

In a de-globalized economy, demographic trends will adversely impact finance. From 1990 through 2020, the largest group of people were in their late forties through early sixties, and they contributed skilled labor and investments to their economies. After 2020, this group began retiring, and world populations lack enough young people to take their place. Lending costs will rise, and investment will decline. The Millennial generation gives the US an advantage, but t will be harder to obtain financing in a de-globalized world, a reality that will further slow economic growth.

In the globalized economy, oil shipments were protected, but in a de-globalized world, geographic location will matter. Shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf may not be safe and with the exception of eight countries, including the US, oil shortages will occur. Because people will be unwilling to return to preindustrial conditions, Zeihan anticipates a significant increase in the use of coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel, and notes that solar and wind power cannot provide sufficient energy to offset oil shortages.

To maintain modern lifestyles, countries must have access to industrial materials, which were traded safely during the globalization period. In a de-globalized world, the US will have access to these materials, and the UK, France, Turkey, Japan, and Russia will attempt to gain access, but most countries will go without. China was the largest importer, processor, and exporter of many of these materials during the globalization period, but Zeihan argues that China will lack the money and labor power to maintain that role. For example, China processes 90% of rare earth elements and while backup processing facilities exist, shortages are likely during the transition period.

In the globalized economy, East Asia was the manufacturing center, and its products could be safely shipped to European and American markets. Given the impending demographic collapse in East Asia, especially China, its position in world manufacturing is unsustainable. Additionally, without safe transport, China is too far from Europe and the US. In a de-globalized world, manufacturing products closer to end markets will make more sense. Zeihan posits that North America is best positioned to assume a dominant manufacturing role, given its demographics and geographic assets. In a world of de-globalized manufacturing, some countries will lose access to products, while others will face higher prices.

The most important sector is agriculture, and in the global economy, most countries import food and produce highly specialized cash products. De-globalization changes in other sectors will negatively impact food production. Without safe transport, shipping food will become untenable. Farmers will be unable to finance their operations, and industrial materials for manufacturing fertilizers will be in short supply. Countries will have to grow food internally or obtain it from friendly neighbors, and the transition period will result in famine all over the world. Climate change will further reduce supplies of food. The US and other food exporters, such as France, Argentina, and New Zealand, will have enough but other countries, like China, will need to reverse urbanization trends and return people to small farms. Sub-Saharan African countries simply will not have enough food.

For most countries, de-globalization will have severely negative consequences. The US will emerge even stronger than it was in the global economy, after a period of adjustment. Elsewhere, regional powers will likely emerge, possibly Japan, the UK, Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand together, and Spain and Portugal. A world of regional powers is a more dangerous one, and violence will be a looming threat.